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Advocating for Change? How a Civil Society-led Coalition
Inﬂuences the Implementation of the Forest Rights Act in India
CLARE BARNES, FRANK VAN LAERHOVEN and PETER P.J. DRIESSEN*
Utrecht University, The Netherlands
Summary.— Forest policy implementation is a political endeavor involving both state and non-state actors. We observe that civil soci-
ety organizations (CSOs) often federate into civil society-led coalitions (CSCs) in order to shape forest policies in their favor. They ap-
pear to be successful in doing this during the policy design phase but we know little about whether they are able to see through to
implementation the changes they have put in motion. Analyzing CSC strategies during policy implementation could help to explain vari-
ation in the extent to which forest policies are successfully implemented. This paper analyzes the strategy choices and potential impact
during policy implementation of a loose CSC comprised of CSOs, activists, people’s movements, researchers, and lawyers that advocates
for the full implementation of the Forest Rights Act in India. Drawing from the Advocacy Coalition Framework’s focus on belief sys-
tems, complemented by insights from political ecology and civil society/social movements literature, we develop a framework to analyze
CSC strategy choices. Our analysis is conducted at the national level and in two states, Andhra Pradesh and Odisha. We employ qual-
itative research methods, including 38 interviews with CSC and non-CSC members, and a comprehensive analysis of the main CSC list-
serv and 1000 relevant English language newspaper articles. Our study reveals that the CSC employs a range of conﬂictive and
collaborative strategies in its attempts to inﬂuence state-led implementation processes, at both national and state levels. It draws on
a loose, heterogeneous network with ability to connect internally and a clear moral justiﬁcation of its involvement in FRA implemen-
tation. However the diverse range of views on the implementation issues held by CSC members, lack of dedicated funding for coordi-
nation, limited legitimacy in the eyes of some state actors and a constricting wider institutional setting, impedes the CSC’s ability to make
coalition-level strategy decisions. Our results lead us to argue that CSCs are undoubtedly active in forest policy implementation at the
national level and in the two states analyzed, though limited coordination of strategies potentially restricts their impact on the policy
implementation process.
 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The implementation of forest policies that have the poten-
tial to signiﬁcantly impact large swathes of forests and the
lives of the millions of people depending on them, can hardly
be seen as an apolitical endeavor. Yet, the political nature of
forest policy implementation remains understudied
(Kashwan, 2013; Krott et al., 2014). While forest policies
are primarily the responsibility of states, civil society organi-
zations (CSOs), in their many forms, have the potential to
signiﬁcantly aﬀect their implementation (Blaikie &
Springate-Baginksi, 2007). They often federate into groups
to increase their chances of doing so. This paper aims to
advance our understanding of the strategy choices of civil
society-led coalitions (CSCs) in their attempts to inﬂuence
forest policy implementation at the national and sub-
national levels. CSCs can be formed by various CSOs includ-
ing Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), people’s
movements, community based organizations (CBOs), acti-
vists, unions, plus researchers, lawyers, and journalists. Their
members share beliefs on whether a policy should be imple-
mented and engage in non-trivial forms of collective action
to shape policy implementation in their favor (Sabatier &
Weible, 2007). We deﬁne policy implementation here as
‘‘what happens between an apparent intention on the part
of the government to do something, or to stop doing some-
thing, and the ultimate impact in the world of action”
(O’Toole, 2000, p.266). We focus on forest policy implemen-
tation as these policies aﬀect often conﬂicting environmental,
social, and economic interests which has led to political
struggles between states and CSOs at international, national
and local levels (Arts & Buizer, 2009; Blaikie & Springate-
Baginksi, 2007).
The traditional view of policy implementation as a distinct,
technical activity which follows a politically laden policy
design phase comprising deliberations over policy problems,
goals and instruments, has been widely criticized (Lester &
Goggin, 1998; O’Toole, 2000; Torenvlied & Thompson,
2003; Van Eerd, Dieperink, & Wiering, 2015). Rather, policy
implementation should be seen as a continuation of a political
process, involving debate and struggles between a multitude of
state, non-state actors and target groups, each attempting to
shape implementation according to their own beliefs and inter-
ests (Blaikie & Springate-Baginksi, 2007; Clement, 2010; Hill
& Hupe, 2002; Kashwan & Lobo, 2014; Sabatier & Jenkins-
Smith, 1999). While political attention at the center moves
on to the next agenda item (termed by Hill and Hupe (2002)
as early policy-making), the politics of policy implementation
(or late policy-making) gets underway across a plethora of dif-
fuse decision-making arenas, often at sub-national govern-
mental levels (Pollard & Court, 2007).
Civil society scholars raise the need for rigorous analysis of
the potential of CSOs to aﬀect change in policy processes (e.g.,
Bebbington, Hickey, & Mitlin, 2007; Edwards, 2009). They
observe that CSOs often federate into loose coalitions to pro-
mote collective goals (Edwards, 2009; Hertel, 2015; Krinsky &
Crossley, 2014; Lecy, Schmitz, & Swedlund, 2012) 1. This com-
mon goal (such as advocating for or against a particular legis-
lation or infrastructural project) spurs a diverse set of actors,
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who bring their own networks, interests, and approaches, to
engage in collective action. Most empirical research of these
CSCs has been directed at early policy-making, especially their
capacities to successfully raise issues up the political agenda
and aﬀect policy changes at national (Hertel, 2015) and inter-
national arenas (Berlin, 2009; Pattberg & Widerberg, 2015).
Comparatively less is known about what these coalitions do
once the policy they advocated for or fought against is being
implemented (e.g., Lele & Menon, 2014; on the Chipko move-
ment in 1970s India; Gupta, 2014), i.e., during the politics of
late policy-making.
Processes of implementing forest policies encounter various
implementation issues leading to them not achieving their
intended goals (Clement, 2010; Fleischman, 2014; see Hill &
Hupe, 2002, for theoretical perspectives on ‘‘implementation
deﬁcits” as coined by Pressman and Wildavsky). So, it appears
that CSCs struggle to see through to full implementation the
changes they have been so successful at putting into motion.
What happens then to these CSCs post policy enactment?
What strategy choices do CSCs make to inﬂuence forest policy
implementation, why and with what potential eﬀect?
To answer this question, we take as a case study the CSC
attempting to inﬂuence the implementation of The Scheduled
Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of
Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (hereafter FRA) at national and state
levels in India. This Act marks a major shift toward the recog-
nition of forest dwellers’ individual and/or community rights
to the land they have inhabited for generations and as will
be argued later, can provide an illuminating case of CSC strat-
egy choices in policy implementation processes. Several
authors have analyzed the CSC which advocated for the
FRA and was involved in its design and drafting (see
Kashwan, 2013; Kumar & Kerr, 2012; Springate-Baginski
et al., 2009) but a systematic analysis of the strategy choices
of the CSC during policy implementation has yet to be con-
ducted. It is particularly interesting to take the FRA as a case,
given current wider debates on the relevance of tenure security
for international forestry programs, such as REDD+ (see
Resosudarmo, Atmadja, Ekaputri, Intarini, and Indriatmoko
(2014) for an analysis of tenure security as a precondition
for eﬀective REDD+ implementation, Sunderlin et al. (2014)
for a discussion on vertical integration of national and local
level eﬀorts to reduce tenure insecurity, and Ravikumar,
Larson, Duchelle, Myers, and Gonzales Tovar (2015) for the
horizontal governance challenges of reducing tenure insecu-
rity). Our analysis contributes to this discussion through
increasing our understanding of how such forest tenure poli-
cies themselves are implemented. It is therefore relevant for
scholars interested in CSCs and policy implementation, espe-
cially policies aﬀecting forest tenure.
2. BACKGROUND TO INDIAN FOREST
GOVERNANCE AND FRA
During the colonial era in India, the rights of forest dwell-
ers were usurped in the name of centralized commercial for-
estry. Post-independence forest policies (such as the Wildlife
Protection Act of 1972 and Forest Conservation Act of 1980)
continued to label forest dwellers as ‘‘encroachers” on forest-
land (Aggarwal, 2011; Blaikie & Springate-Baginksi, 2007).
Though there had been earlier agitations, it was when the
Ministry of Environment and Forests misinterpreted court
orders in 2002 and started a mass eviction drive of those liv-
ing in forests, that the contestation surrounding forest dwell-
ers’ rights really gained momentum (Springate-Baginski,
2009). Grassroots people’s movements ultimately federated
into a coalition with like-minded activists, left-leaning politi-
cians, and academics under the national-level banner Cam-
paign for Survival and Dignity (CSD) (Kumar & Kerr,
2012) and demanded a ‘‘comprehensive replacement of the
oppressive control of the forest bureaucracy on forested
tribal homelands by restoring democratic control over forest
governance to statutorily empowered village assemblies”
(Sarin & Springate-Baginski, 2010, p. 6). The CSD faced
fervent opposition from a lobby group of ‘‘fortress
conservation” wildlife organizations and individuals
(Springate-Baginski, 2009) who claimed in the media that
granting rights to forest dwellers will lead to biodiversity loss
(Aggarwal, 2011; Kashwan, 2013; Kumar & Kerr, 2012).
Kashwan (2013) also identiﬁes a third group advocating in
favor of community-based conservation.
The FRA was ﬁnally passed in 2007, with the accompanying
rules enacted in January 2008. It includes (i) provisions on the
individual and community rights that can be claimed, (ii) the
process for claiming these rights, which starts with communi-
ties forming a Forest Rights Committee to verify claims, and
(iii) the empowerment of right-holders for conservation and
protection of the land or resources granted (Saxena, 2010).
3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
(a) Justifying our focus on CSCs
There is strong empirical evidence that actors in a policy
subsystem (such as surrounding the FRA) aggregate them-
selves into coalitions to advance their mutual goals (e.g.,
Edwards, 2009; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Springate-
Baginski, 2009). Krinsky and Crossley (2014) argue that social
movements in particular are often conceptualized as networks
of activists and/or organizations, which can overlap with pol-
icy networks. Similarly, Tilly (2005, p.61) argues that ‘‘con-
stituent units of claim-making actors often consist not of
living, breathing whole individuals, but of groups, organiza-
tions, bundles of social ties” leading to the blurring of state/
non-state boundaries (Deo & McDuie-Ra, 2011; Springate-
Baginski, 2009). In the Advocacy Coalition Framework
(ACF) literature, coalitions have been empirically identiﬁed
and analyzed in controversy-ridden natural resource policy
sub-systems, similar to the subject of this paper (for example,
Matti & Sandstro¨m, 2011; Weible, 2005; Winkel & Sotirov,
2011). Two characteristics broadly deﬁne a coalition: their
members share policy beliefs which are normative beliefs that
project an image of how the subsystem ought to be and they
engage in a non-trivial degree of coordination (Sabatier &
Weible, 2007).
While coalition members share policy beliefs, they may dis-
play heterogeneity in (i) their views on particular issues or
means to address problems in policy implementation (ACF
calls these secondary beliefs, see Weible, Sabatier, &
McQueen, 2009), (ii) the types of organizations, networks,
and overlapping or complementary coalitions they are part
of (Kumar, 2014), and (iii) their personal interests for reaching
the mutual goal (Kumar, 2014). The degree of coordination
within a coalition can range from strong (e.g., developing
and implementing a common plan) to weak (monitoring each
other’s actions and responding with complementary strategies)
(Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Coordination can encompass vary-
ing forms (Weible et al., 2009). For example, Matti and
Sandstro¨m (2011) analyze coordination as the sharing of
information and the seeking of advice.
ADVOCATING FOR CHANGE? HOW A CIVIL SOCIETY-LED COALITION INFLUENCES 163
When a policy such as the FRA moves into the late policy-
making phase, the CSC advocating for its implementation at
state level could alter along several lines. The shared policy
beliefs for full FRA implementation may be suﬃcient to bind
a coalition as they advocate for legislation to be passed (as
shown by Kumar and Kerr (2012) regarding the CSD), but
is this suﬃcient to maintain coordination during policy imple-
mentation? We can expect views on how implementation
should be realized to diﬀer across coalition members, which
may impact the strength of coordination during implementa-
tion. Applying ACF terminology here, we would expect a shift
from strong to weaker coordination as decision-making
venues shift. Strategy choices may also alter as (i) what
worked during policy design at national level is no precursor
for success during policy implementation at state level, and
(ii) the expected eﬀectiveness of certain strategies may be per-
ceived as varying across states.
(b) What strategy choices can CSCs make?
Access to resources is often conﬂated with power, but it is
only when resources are actually employed through strategies
that the behavior of another actor can be inﬂuenced (Arts &
Van Tatenhove, 2004; Avelino & Rotmans, 2009; Berlin,
2009). The spectrum of strategy choices listed below can be
drawn from in order to mobilize available resources in an
attempt to convert (relational) power into actual inﬂuence
on the state actors responsible for policy implementation.
Our typology of strategy choices at the disposal of CSCs is
loosely based on Biermann and Siebenhu¨ner (2009) and
Widerberg and Van Laerhoven (2014) who make a distinction
between cognitive, normative, and executive strategies. For
analytical purposes it is useful to make this distinction in strat-
egy types, however we recognize that one action undertaken
can contain elements of multiple strategy types. For example,
framing research in a particular light in the media contains
both normative and cognitive elements.
Firstly, a CSC could make use of cognitive strategies (Krott
et al., 2014; Sabatier & Weible, 2007) deﬁned here as the con-
struction and communication of knowledge (Avelino &
Rotmans, 2011, p.803) to advocate for their policy beliefs.
Lindblom (1968 in Weiss, 2000) argues that in political
decision-making in a democracy, knowledge is used as a polit-
ical weapon in the fray while Pollard and Court (2007) stress
that communicating evidence, rather than its empirical basis,
is critical in inﬂuencing policy.
Secondly, executive strategies whereby coalitions use their
position (e.g., in terms of proximity to the policy imple-
menters) to either assist or lobby states (Sabatier & Weible,
2007) could be used. Tools employed here could be trainings,
demonstrations, or contacting decision-makers. We diﬀerenti-
ate between transitive power (conﬂict-oriented zero-sum
games) and intransitive power (all achieve something in a col-
lective eﬀort) to discuss executive strategies as being either
conﬂictive or collaborative (see also Arts & Van Tatenhove,
2004; Gupta, 2014; Hertel, 2015; Kashwan & Lobo, 2014).
However, we recognize that organizations could be simultane-
ously with and against the state (so employing conﬂictive and
collaborative executive strategies) depending on the particular
(sub)issues they concurrently aim to address and individuals
they are approaching (Hertel, 2015).
The third type of strategy CSCs can employ are normative
strategies which are used to inﬂuence the process of how an
act is interpreted and the rules are framed (Majone, 1989). A
coalition uses tools such as diﬀusion of framing (Krinsky &
Crossley, 2014; Weible, Heikkila, deLeon, & Sabatier, 2012)
or ‘‘coining or popularising particular vocabulary” (Pollard
& Court, 2007, p.136) to garner support for their viewpoint
from diﬀerent publics. Indeed Kumar and Kerr (2012, p.768)
found the CSC’s ‘‘capability to generate and circulate credible
frames of justice, legitimacy and rights of the poor” to be inﬂu-
ential in the policy design phase. Lukes (2005) argues that this
form of inﬂuence may not be explicitly directed at a particular
institution or actor, rather this ‘‘third form of power” can
shape actors’ perceptions and preferences without explicit
coercion. Applied here, by diﬀusing frames of forest dwellers’
rights, actors’ perceptions of the need to implement FRA may
be positively aﬀected.
These three types of strategies can be aimed at various audi-
ences. In this case, India’s highly centralized federal system
means policies passed by the Union government (center) are
implemented by states (Gupta, 2001). The 42nd Constitutional
Amendment in 1976 moved forests from the State List to the
Concurrent List, meaning state decisions on forests require
central government assent. However, the economic and polit-
ical importance of the states is growing (Jo¨rgensen & Wagner,
2015) and, depending on the legal status of the policy, there is
room for states to adjust policies and give their own emphasis
to certain aspects of the policy. Gupta (2014) highlights the
variations in policy-making between states, as well as over
issues and time. The complex forest governance framework
has been observed by scholars such as Kumar and Kerr
(2012) and Blaikie and Springate-Baginksi (2007), with the
former authors arguing that the ‘‘arena of political struggle”
has shifted from the center to the states as the FRA is being
implemented.
There are thus multiple decision-making venues involved in
policy implementation allowing for a multitude of actors and
institutions at central and state levels toward which the CSC
could direct its eﬀorts (Gupta, 2014). At the national executive
level both the Ministry of Tribal Aﬀairs (MoTA) as the nodal
agency, and the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Cli-
mate Change (MoEFC), are important ministries, the
Supreme Court as the highest judiciary and members of the
Lok Sabha as the legislative, could receive attention from
the coalition. Though department names vary, at state level
the CSC could direct their eﬀorts toward the departments
Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes (S.T. & S.C.), Envi-
ronment/Forest, Revenue and Panchayati Raj, as well as
members of the Legislative Assembly, and the High Court
judiciary. We also include the national media in our analytical
framework, as a medium through which coalitions can employ
normative strategies (see above). We limit our analysis to CSC
strategies aimed at national and state level decision-making
venues, while acknowledging that members often also work
with forest dwellers at a local level on implementation issues
(see Barnes & Van Laerhoven, 2015).
(c) Why and how do CSCs make certain strategy choices?
Strategy choices are informed by both access to resources
and the CSC’s own assessment of which strategies are most
likely to be successful. Table 1 gives an overview of the types
of resources that may be accessed and subsequently mobilized
by means of the strategies outlined above. We divide the
resources into those accessed at the coalition level and those
which are speciﬁcally found at the level of coalition members,
the total of which can be accessed by the coalition (See
Table 1).
We can expect CSCs to direct their eﬀorts toward strategies
and decision-making venues where they feel they will have the
most success. So while the resource mix at their disposal may
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Table 1. Types of resources which could be accessed by the coalition or members
Resource Description and justiﬁcation References
Coalition level
Internal coalition network Ability to connect: In order to draw on (concentrated or fragmented) capabilities, dense,
well-connected networks (i.e. with high network closure either directly well-connected or
through a central ‘‘bridging” actor) are useful. This allows the coalition actors to share
knowledge, solidarity, advocacy skills, and experiences
Adam and Kriesi (2007), Kumar and Kerr (2012), Krinsky and
Crossley (2014), Sandstro¨m and Rova (2009), Sabatier and Weible
(2007) and Kumar (2014)
Homogeneity of beliefs: Policy beliefs—and to a lesser extent, secondary beliefs—bind
the coalition. A high level of shared beliefs is a strong resource for the coalition
Heterogeneity of members: A higher number of diﬀerent organizations and sectors
represented in the network increases the capabilities at the coalition’s disposal. This is
especially the case as members may be simultaneously part of a number of coalitions.
However, transaction costs related to coordination may increase as the diversity of
actors brings potentially diverging perspectives, interests, and goals
Legitimacy Legitimacy has been deﬁned as a generalized perception or assumption that the actions
of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed
systems of norms, values, beliefs, and deﬁnitions (Suchman, 1995, p. 574 cited in Lister,
2003). It can consist of legality (i.e. the formal expression of rights, duties and
expectations, found at the organizational level), moral justiﬁcations of an institution and
the actions undertaken, and consent and acceptance by diﬀerent audiences of actions and/
or portrayal of knowledge which could be found at coalition level
Schouten and Glasbergen (2011), Berlin (2009), Lister (2003) and
Blaikie and Springate-Baginksi (2007)
Wider Institutional setting By this we mean the political opportunity structure, the wider public opinion, and the
rule structures under which the coalition operates. This could be the rules under which
civil society can participate in state implementation of national policies, the tools (such
as Right to Information) which can be drawn on by coalitions, or a particular event in
the institutional setting which could be favorable (a window of opportunity). This
resource originates beyond the coalition and aﬀects the coalition as a whole
Gupta (2014), Berlin (2009), Sabatier and Weible (2007), Krott
et al. (2014), Arts and Van Tatenhove (2004) and Kingdon and
Thurber (1984)
Members level
Finance The organizations within the coalition receive or generate funding, not the coalition.
Financial resources allow coalition members to gain other resources
Berlin (2009), Sabatier and Weible (2007) and Blaikie and
Springate-Baginksi (2007)
Knowledge Members may have diﬀerent types of knowledge (scientiﬁc, local, and regarding FRA),
the total of which is available to the coalition. Types of knowledge more readily
accepted by others e.g. scientiﬁc knowledge is an especially useful resource
Krott et al. (2014) and Blaikie and Springate-Baginksi (2007)
Argumentation skills Individuals can possess the skill ‘‘to argue, to name and to frame” which results in
discursive power (Arts & Van Tatenhove, 2004, p.340; Fischer, 2003)
Arts and Van Tatenhove (2004), Berlin (2009) and Fischer (2003)
Personal motivation The willingness to apply resources using a particular strategy is seen as a condition of
power held by an individual organization
Avelino and Rotmans (2011)
External connections Here, we refer to connections with the state—or institutional access. Individual
organizations have their own connections and networks, the total of which is available
to the coalition
Berlin (2009), Kumar and Kerr (2012)
Legitimacy Legality (see legitimacy under Coalition level for the explanation) Schouten and Glasbergen (2011)
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allow for multiple strategies to be employed, the interplay of
many other elements can aﬀect their choice of strategy. This
may be due to their own norms, as well as their perceptions
of the success rate of strategies employed in the past, and
the personalities of the individuals in oﬃcial positions
(Blaikie & Springate-Baginksi, 2007) to which they direct their
eﬀorts.
(d) Analytical framework
In Figure 1 we show the three elements comprising our
framework for analyzing which strategy choices are made
and why. The relationship between the resources which can
be accessed by a CSC and the strategies employed is complex.
Therefore we do not draw direct causal links between particu-
lar resources and strategy choices. Rather, a CSC’s available
resource mix and its anticipated level of success at any given
time inﬂuence, both (i) its ability to make coalition-level strat-
egy choices, and (ii), the range of strategy types and target
audiences available.
We turn to the third part of our research question, i.e., the
potential eﬀect of these strategy choices, in the discussion sec-
tion. Given the complexity of policy decisions made by state
organizations, it is not possible to measure the direct eﬀect
of particular strategy choices. Our literature review presented
above, does however allow us to speculate on the potential
eﬀect of the choices made on policy implementation.
4. RESEARCH DESIGN
(a) Case selection
The implementation of the FRA presents an interesting case
study for three reasons. Firstly, it is a contentious forest policy
currently being implemented at the state level across India.
Secondly, we see that CSCs were greatly inﬂuential in the pol-
icy design stage with people’s movements, activists and left-
leaning politicians and academics federating under the banner
Campaign for Survival and Dignity (CSD) (Gopalakrishnan,
2012a; Kashwan, 2013; Kumar & Kerr, 2012). Thirdly, the
pro-FRA CSC, centered around the CSD, was not completely
satisﬁed with the ﬁnal provisions in the FRA (Bhullar, 2008)
as they had been watered down by parliament (Springate-
Baginski, Sarin, & Reddy, 2013). We can therefore reasonably
expect that this CSC would continue to attempt to inﬂuence
FRA implementation after the FRA Rules were passed in
2008.
(b) Identiﬁcation of the CSC at the national level
Sabatier and Weible’s (2007) two criteria for identiﬁcation
of coalitions were used to identify the CSC at a national level.
Firstly, shared policy beliefs are revealed by signatories to
statements and open letters issued by the CSD (available
online: http://www.forestrightsact.com/statements-and-news/
135-joint-statement-on-anti-fra-case-in-sc). Signatories share
the belief that the FRA should be fully and widely imple-
mented. Secondly, a non-trivial degree of coordination is
shown, for example, through participation of diﬀerent types
of organizations and individuals at regular national level meet-
ings. At least three meetings per year were jointly organized,
usually by NGOs. The largest meeting in 2013 attracted 255
participants from NGOs, activists, lawyers, grassroots move-
ments etc. across 13 states. It was jointly organized by an
NGO in the Community Forest Rights Learning and Advo-
cacy Process (CFR-LA)group, and people’s movement
(AJAM). As an illustration, we show in Table 2 the three large
meetings in the year 2013. The majority of attendees worked at
NGOs, though at each meeting a signiﬁcant number attended
from other types of CSOs. Each meeting resulted in a shared
statement of key issues and recommendations.
The CSC is identiﬁed at the national level. Implementation
of the FRA is the responsibility of states therefore we analyze
two levels of strategy choices within the CSC; (i) national, and
(ii) members based in two selected states, namely Andhra Pra-
desh (AP) and Odisha. These States are both actively imple-
menting the FRA but diﬀer on aspects that create an
interesting backdrop for exploring the strategy choices of the
CSCs at state level. Firstly, the recent history of forest policy
implementation diﬀers. Odisha has a much richer history of
strong grassroots organizations opposing what is seen as state
Figure 1. Analytical framework.
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interferences on forestland, compared to AP. Secondly, diﬀer-
ences in FRA implementation processes hint at variations in
the roles of CSCs. The two states responded diﬀerently to a
common critique point in the ﬁrst year of FRA implementa-
tion regarding forest rights committees, set up to review
claims. These were supposed to be formed at hamlet level,
but in reality were being constituted at village level. In Odisha
this was corrected very quickly, while in AP this continued
into the ﬁrst implementation phase. Also in AP, the village-
level committees (Van Sanrakshan Samiti (VSS)) previously
formed under a diﬀerent program, Joint Forest Management,
were highly controversially converted into the Forest Rights
Committees under FRA, while no such attempt at rushed
implementation was undertaken in Odisha.
(c) Operationalization and data collection
Table 3 gives an overview of how we operationalized the ele-
ments in our analytical framework and the data sources (see
data key).
Data key
(1) 22 in-depth interviews with CSC members based in
Odisha, AP or active at the national level, comple-
mented with the following interviews: two CSOs oppos-
ing FRA implementation, seven high-level MoEFC
oﬃcials, four Forest Department oﬃcials, and three
researchers in July and August 2014.
(2) Interviews with seven MoEFC, two AP, and two Odi-
sha Forest Department oﬃcials in July and August
2014.
(3) CFR-LA listserv analysis of all posts 2012–14.
(4) CFR-LA listserv analysis of two non-consecutive
months per year in the period 2012–14.
(5) Top 1000 newspaper articles retrieved from the Lexis
Nexis Academic search engine using the search term
‘‘Forest Rights Act”, in all English language news,
during January 01, 2008 to April 17, 2014, ﬁltered to
national-level publications and all articles in the top 5
national Hindi language newspapers, same time period,
referring to ‘‘Forest Rights Act” (450 articles).
While we are aware that incidents of misreporting in Indian
newspapers do occur, our steps of (1) analyzing a large num-
ber of articles, (2) selecting only direct quotations and (3) ana-
lyzing the articles collectively to draw out patterns, means we
do gain an impression of the normative strategies employed. A
similar method was successfully undertaken by Forsyth (2007)
in Thailand to analyze representation of activists in the media.
Our use of gray literature is necessitated by the absence of
scientiﬁc reports on the coalition’s activities during late
policy-making. Gray literature (such as meeting reports and
newspaper articles) is also an appropriate empirical source
for the data we require.
5. RESULTS
(a) Strategies
For each strategy we indicate whether they are performed by
the CSC at national, state or member level. Where possible we
include which type(s) of organization employed the strategy.
(i) Cognitive strategies
At the national level CFR-LA conventions case studies con-
taining local knowledge are compiled and widely circulated to
oﬃcials, beyond those attending the meetings (e.g., Desor,
2013).
At the state level, there is potential for coordinating research
in Odisha, through the small group of NGOs in the FRA
Alliance. Our interview data seem to indicate that in AP
there is no or little coordinated research undertaken at the
CSC level.
Our interviews reveal that cognitive strategies are mostly
implemented by individual or small groups of members, rather
than at either national or state level. In terms of scientiﬁc
research this covers issues in the claims processes, placement
of FRA in a wider institutional setting, and post-claims forest
governance. Several publications have arisen from the
research, which are made public through websites, regular
newsletters (two NGOs) and listservs (activists and
Table 2. Participants at national-level CSC meetings in 2013
Name of meeting National Consultation on Community
Forest Rights under Forest Rights
National Consultation
on Forest Rights Act
and Protected Areas
National-level public hearing on
community forest rights
Date March 2013 Nov. 2013 Dec. 2013
Organized by Vasundhara and Kalpavriksh, supported
by Oxfam India
Future of Conservation
group (FoC)
CFR-LA and AJAM
Participants
Total 73 35 250
Type (no. participants/no. organizations) No. organizations presenting
case studies
NGO 38/24 20/11 10
People’s movement 9/7 5/4 6
CSD organizer 4 2
Activist group 3/2 2/2 5
Lawyer 1 3
Academic 12/10 4/3 1
Journalist 2/2 2/2
Donor 2/2 2/2
International Governmental Organization 2/2
Government initiative 1
Guest 1 union level MP 2 union level oﬃcials
(MoTA), state FD
oﬃcials
2 state level MPs
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academics). Members have also published in Economic and
Political Weekly magazine (e.g., Rao, 2014), and have pub-
lished books (such as Lele & Menon, 2014). Two of the
NGO members undertook commissioned research for MoTA
on FRA implementation.
Aside from research, NGOs and activists in both states
translate FRA guides into the local language. In both states
NGOs and a lawyer train oﬃcials of the Forest, Tribal Wel-
fare, Panchayati Raj, and Revenue departments. One NGO
in Odisha produced a training module for oﬃcials commis-
sioned by UNDP/MoTA. Local knowledge is also an impor-
tant part of both conﬂictive and collaborative executive
strategies as will be discussed in Section 5(a)(ii).
All in all, it appears that cognitive strategies are widely
employed by various types of members, with scientiﬁc research
also being collated and communicated by the CSC at national
and state levels through direct connections with the executive,
legislative, and bureaucracy.
(ii) Executive strategies
The CSC employs a combination of collaborative and con-
ﬂictive strategies, which are initiated by various members and
executed by the wider coalition at either national or state level,
as shown in Table 4. 2
In addition, a signiﬁcant collaborative strategy undertaken
at national level by a small group of CSC members, was their
participation in a Joint Committee set up by MoEFC and
MoTA in 2010 to review the implementation of the FRA,
under the chairmanship of the Retired Secretary of the
Planning Commission, N.C. Saxena. Involvement in such a
committee also contains strong cognitive elements as members
are able to communicate their on-the-ground knowledge
directly to actors from the executive and bureaucracy. The
Joint Committee was comprised of 20 members including
two academics, four representatives of NGOs, one representa-
tive of a people’s movement and activists brought in as expert
members (Saxena et al., 2010). The larger NGOs and lawyers
interviewed stressed the need to balance conﬂictive and collab-
orative strategies in order to engage in a ‘‘positive way” (four
NGOs, two lawyers). However, the strong reaction of some
activists to this choice of collaborative strategy reveals diverg-
ing secondary beliefs between CSC members at the national
level about how to achieve full FRA implementation.
Individual members compliment the CSC strategies by sepa-
rately employing mostly conﬂictive strategies such as writing
letters to both national-level executive and legislative politi-
cians (one activist, two NGOs) and state-level legislature and
bureaucracy (ﬁve NGOs, two activists and a lawyer). Such
actions also contain clear cognitive elements as local knowl-
edge, and expertise in understanding and translating FRA leg-
islation are drawn on to strengthen these actions.
(iii) Normative strategies
Our analysis revealed a lack of coordinated normative
strategies at both national and state levels. CSC members
quoted in the English language media analyzed spoke in an
individual capacity, or representing CSD, rather than on
behalf of the wider CSC. Three members (one activist, two
NGOs) were mentioned ﬁve times or more during the
period analyzed (Table 5). The ﬁnal column shows that only
Table 3. Operationalization of the variables
Strategies Indicators Data
Cognitive Research conducted and communicated to state actors or to the media, use of local knowledge and FRA
policy knowledge
1,3
Executive Evidence of speciﬁc collaborative or conﬂictive strategies 1,3
Normative Newspaper analysis of organizations mentioned in the media and their framing of FRA. Mentioned is
deﬁned as directly quoted, events covered, or open letters published
5
Resources Indictors Data
Coalition level
Internal coalition network Ability to connect: analysis of posts to main listserv administered by the CFR-LA. Purpose of posts and
meeting invitations analyzed
4
Homogeneity of beliefs: views on the reasons why FRA should be implemented and views on the main
implementation issues (secondary beliefs). Open questions posed to reduce socially acceptable answers.
Coded and clustered using Discourse Network Analyser (DNA)
1
Heterogeneity of members: classiﬁcation of member types (NGO, activist etc.) 3,1
Legitimacy Moral standing: Statements used by the coalition to justify their involvement in FRA 1
Consent and acceptance: Evidence of state actors commissioning work from the CSC or attending CSC
meetings, roles MoEFC/FD actors feel the CSC should engage in and why this role is justiﬁed. We focus
on MoEFC/FD actors as they are generally resistant to the FRA, yet are in positions to signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence its implementation (Springate-Baginski et al., 2013)
2,3
Wider institutional setting Derived by asking what aﬀects CSC eﬀectiveness 1
Members level
Finance Perception of reliability and ﬂexibility of funding 1
Knowledge Of FRA and related acts: Involvement in drafting FRA or other policies (e.g. Land Acquisition Act, Joint
Forest Management)
1
Of ground issues: Activities/research conducted at ground level (directly/through partner CBOs)
Argumentation skills History of advocacy, involvement in other campaigns (e.g. Right to Information, Land Acquisition Act),
experience ﬁling petitions
1
Personal motivation Size of FRA component in their work, previous involvement in CSD campaign 1
External connections Connections with other civil society networks, membership of boards, connections with the state 1,3
Legitimacy Legality: Registered organizations 1
Anticipated level of success Open question on why certain strategies are chosen 1
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13 articles were published in a top 10 English language Daily
based on readership in 2012 (2013 ﬁgures were under revision)
(Tambat, xxxx) or by a news agency. Three interviewees (two
activists, one NGO) stated that they direct eﬀorts toward the
media when national-level events such as General Elections
or the FRA rule amendments open up the media space for
them and one activist stated that the media can be used to
disseminate any government plans to dilute the FRA.
Across the 450 Hindi language newspaper articles reviewed,
only one CSC actor, a Supreme Court lawyer, was quoted.
Most articles covering FRA did not mention speciﬁc actors.
In 14 of the 27 articles analyzed (Table 5) the members
framed their arguments in terms of the illegal nature of any
government (in)actions which hinder FRA implementation.
A second frame used six times was that of the historical injus-
tice corrected by the FRA, and the democratic rights of the
forest dwellers. Both powerful frames are diﬃcult to refute
given forest history in India. One activist stated that he framed
demands in the media in such a way to shape current public
opinion. Emotive language was used by the CSD activists
within the coalition to denote the actions of Union and State
governments, such as them ‘‘actively sabotaging” the FRA
(Gopalakrishnan, 2012b).
Most interviewees referred to their state-level media connec-
tions as a means to share local-level implementation issues, or
success stories. However, two NGOs interviewed shared their
caution with publicity seeking as it may damage their longer
term inﬂuence with state actors.
(b) Coalition-level resources
(i) Internal coalition network
Ability to connect: Members have access to up-to-date web-
sites (www.fra.org.in, www.forestrightsact.com), and a listserv
run by CFR-LA. This is an open Google group of more than
350 members comprising NGOs (approx. 40–50%), people’s
movements (20–30%), researchers (15%) and a few journalists.
Between 30 and 100 new posts per month are placed, indicat-
ing the ability to connect with other members. It is used for a
wide variety of purposes though predominantly to transfer
information between national, state, and local levels (see
Table 6).
60% of the posts are from NGOs and 26% are from activists.
There is a small core of more active members with 71% of the
NGO posts being from the two NGOs that set up the website
and listserv, and one activist is responsible for half of the acti-
vists’ posts.
Table 6. Purposes representing >5% of posts on CFR-LA listserv
Purpose Number %
Sharing a newspaper article 57 31
Update on FRA implementation from the ﬁeld 31 17
Sharing oﬃcial letters, notiﬁcations, rules 20 11
Sharing a study/report 13 7
Table 4. Executive Strategies executed
Activity Number (2012–14) Organized by Target audience
National level
Conﬂictive
Convention/Public hearing/Rally 4 (plus 1 organization holds a
rally every parliamentary session)
3 diﬀerent People’s movements Executive (MoTA and MoEFC)
Legislative
Wider public
Open protest letters 7 4 drafted by 1 NGO Executive
3 drafted by CSD
Collaborative
Consultation on NPs and FRA 2 Future of Conservation group Executive
Provide input on draft
government documents
2 People’s movement Executive
CFR-LA
State-level
Conﬂictive
Consultation 2 People’s movement in Odisha Judiciary
Executive
NGO in AP Bureaucracy
Rally 3 People’s movement in Odisha Executive
Bureaucracy
Collaborative
Support of UNDP/MoTA
regional consultations
2 NGO in AP Executive
NGO in Odisha Bureaucracy
Table 5. No. of articles in which CSC members are mentioned per year
Organization (type) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 6/2014 Total High Readership No. (%)
CSD (Activist) 0 1 5 3 2 2 1 14 5 (36)
Kalpavriksh (NGO) 0 0 1 2 4 1 0 8 4 (50)
Vasundhara (NGO) 0 0 1 0 4 0 0 5 4 (80)
Total 0 1 7 5 10 3 1 27 13 (48)
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At least three national-level meetings per year (during the
period 2012–14) were organized by either the CFR-LA group
itself (again, predominantly the same two NGOs who manage
the listserv), the FoC which focuses on protected areas under
FRA, as well as CSD activists and people’s movements. An
open invitation to these meetings is often sent via the listserv.
Our analysis of the participant list of four well-attended
national-level CFR-LA and FoC meetings during 2009–2013
showed that participation ranged from 38 to 255 organiza-
tions. The meetings result in a statement of shared strategies
and individual actions to be undertaken. Each meeting was
mostly attended by diﬀerent organizations—i.e., only four
NGOs participated in all four meetings. This is an indication
that a wide range of individuals and organizations felt able
to attend these meetings and thus connect with other organiza-
tions.
In Odisha, regular open meetings and informal discussions
are held by CSD-Odisha with state- and district-level NGOs
and CBOs indicating an ability to connect. The largest NGOs
have also formed an FRA Alliance research network. In AP,
there is a low ability to connect shown as only one state-
level meeting was held during the period analyzed and only
one member of the CSD is active. Respondents stated that
there is no active network at state level in AP and local CBOs
and NGOs work in isolation, partly due to being more geo-
graphically dispersed.
Shared beliefs: Our analysis of the beliefs of the coalition
members shows that while they shared the common goal of
pushing for FRA implementation, they do this for a variety
of reasons (Tables 7 and 8).
The members generally share the belief that the FRA cor-
rects for historical injustice and that it is possible for forest
dwellers to live in harmony with the forest. Strikingly no orga-
nization gave both the reasons, ‘‘control” and ‘‘forest gover-
nance”. This indicates a possible split in the CSC: eleven
organizations interviewed lean toward seeing the FRA as part
of a wider land rights battle, while seven others see the FRA as
required for successful forest governance.
In total, CSC members raised 26 separate issues they per-
ceived as hindering the smooth implementation of FRA (see
Table 9).
Our analysis using DNA reveals that all organizations share
at least one implementation issue with another organization.
The average number of issues shared is four to ﬁve, up to a
maximum of nine. Only four organizations shared nine issues,
which represents correspondence on 35% of the issues. This
means that in a relation between any two organizations in
the coalition, there are fewer perceived issues joining them
than are particular to either organization.
There is no clear distinction in the perceived implementation
issues based on either type of organization or state located in.
However Table 10 shows that we do observe an interesting
Table 7. Reasons given for FRA implementation
‘‘FRA should be implemented as. . .” Frequencyb
. . .it corrects for historical injustice”
(historical injustice)a
14
. . .communities are able to live in
harmony with the forest” (harmony)
12
. . .a ﬁrst step toward giving forest
dwellers more control over their
resources” (control)
11
. . .recognizing rights of forest dwellers
stimulates good forest governance”
(forest governance)
7
aAbbreviated form of each reason is given in parenthesis, as used in
Table 8.
bN=20, several reasons could be given.
Table 8. Combinations of reasons given as to why FRA should be
implemented
Combinations of reasons given Frequency
historical injustice 2
control 2
control+harmony 2
control+historical injustice 3
control+harmony+historical injustice 4
forest governance 2
forest governance+historical injustice 1
forest governance+harmony+historical injustice 4
Combinations of reasons including control 11
Combination of reasons including forest governance 7
Table 9. Stated FRA implementation issues
Statements on the FRA implementation
issues
Statement frequency
FD want to hold onto the forest resource 20
Many communities require empowerment
to gain rights and govern the forest
sustainably
15
MoTA is a weak industry 13
State governments often delay
implementation
12
Individual rights receive more attention
than community rights
11
Presence of conﬂicting policies, acts and
rules
10
FRA requires new way of thinking from
all levels of government
10
FD often purposefully delay
implementation
10
Recording of titles not done consistently
or correctly
9
Lack of MoTA presence on the ground 9
16 statements with a frequency of <9
Table 10. Comparing reasons given for FRA implementation with stated
implementation issues
Implementation issues Reason why FRA should
be implemented
Control (%) Forest
governance (%)
FD doesn’t have capacity or lacks full
awareness
27 57
Individual rights receive more
attention than community rights
45 86
Inﬂuence of district-level politics on
claims process
9 43
Lack of MoTA presence on the
ground
18 86
Lack of attention for post-claims
support
9 43
State governments delay
implementation
64 29
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pattern when we compare the reasons given for FRA imple-
mentation (Table 8) with some of the implementation issues
(Table 9).
These results indicate that the reasons an organization want
FRA to be implemented has some bearing on where they
direct their eﬀorts post implementation and therefore which
implementation issues they perceive. This point will be
returned to in the discussion.
Heterogeneity of members: On a national level, the CSC
comprises a loose, open, heterogeneous coalition of NGOs,
activists, people’s movements, CBOs, journalists, researchers,
lawyers, and other individuals. There are various network
organizations within the CSC such as the previously men-
tioned CFR-LA, the FoC which focuses on protected areas
under FRA (comprised mostly of CFR-LA members but not
including the activists), CSD and people’s movements AJAM
and All India Union of Forest Working People. The hetero-
geneity of the types and locations of members means that
the strength of connections between members will vary, a
point we return to in the discussion. The heterogeneous mem-
bership means a wide range of member level resources are
brought to the CSC, as seen in Table 11, below.
(ii) Legitimacy
Moral standing: In justifying their involvement in FRA
implementation, CSC members refer to their understanding
of issues on the ground gained through their (i) long-term
involvement at the grassroots levels, either directly or through
their network, and (ii) involvement in drafting the FRA (early
policy-making) or other rights issues. They also share the view
that states will not or cannot implement the FRA without
being pushed by civil society. Combined, this means the
CSC members claim moral standing for the position they take
in FRA implementation.
Consent and acceptance by state actors: The CSC as a whole
is not aﬀorded legitimacy by the MoEFC or FD oﬃcials inter-
viewed. Most oﬃcials felt the CSC’s role should be limited to
what can be considered apolitical roles, such as providing
awareness and guidelines to communities or oﬃcers, technical
support (e.g., mapping), or research on implementation issues.
The academics, lawyers, and larger NGOs appear to be viewed
with less suspicion by the oﬃcials interviewed than activists.
Larger NGOs have been involved in programs led by both
MoEFC and MoTA e.g., the National Biodiversity and
Action plan, and have been asked to train oﬃcials. Four mem-
bers (NGOs, a researcher and activist invited via an NGO)
were asked to participate in the Joint Review of FRA imple-
mentation. The academics and lawyers in the coalition gain
their legitimacy from their professional titles and/or their pub-
lication record. The oﬃcials directed some distrust at the acti-
vists citing skepticism of their personal motivation,
commitment to work in remote rural areas, and openness to
work with government actors.
(iii) Wider Institutional Setting
Political events were seen as both a resource, such as the
2014 Lok Sabha election which increased attention for issues
aﬀecting rural voters, and a hindrance, when the bifurcation
of Telangana and AP States took political and bureaucratic
attention elsewhere. All respondents stated that the current
political climate promotes a form of development which puts
pressure on both the FRA and civil society. The CSC
actively links FRA issues with wider land rights and democ-
racy debates to attract wider support and media coverage at
rallies.
Summarizing, the CSC-level resources to be accessed com-
prise (1) a loose, heterogeneous network with ability to con-
nect, but where members have a diverse range of views on
the implementation issues; (2) a clear moral justiﬁcation of
its involvement in FRA implementation, but mixed legitimacy
in the eyes of the MoEFC/FD and (3) a constricting wider
institutional setting occasionally punctuated with opportune
moments for gaining media attention.
(iv) Organization-level resources
The CSC at national and at state levels can draw on exten-
sive knowledge of the wider institutional setting, FRA provi-
sions and local conditions, plus argumentation skills, legal
legitimacy, and extensive networks beyond the CSC. Mem-
bers’ varied motivations could also be argued to be an impor-
tant resource. Financial limitations, especially the lack of
dedicated funding to facilitate cooperation within the CSC,
is seen as a great restraint. The only resource diﬀerence
between the states, which was reported by four respondents,
is that members in AP receive less funding than Odisha as
AP is seen by donors as being more developed.
(c) Inﬂuence of resource mix and anticipated level of success on
strategy choices
Here we explore the two ways in which the CSC’s strategy
choices are informed by the resource mix accessed by the
Table 11. Level of resources at organization level
Resource Level (no. of respondents)
Finance – No dedicated funding for the CSC to collaborate on strategy choices (all)
– Lack of reliable, dedicated, long-term funding (10)
– Lack of funding for activists does allow for independence (2)
Knowledge – Larger NGOs report to have in-depth knowledge of the institutional setting (8) and on the ground knowledge (9) gained
from involvement in the FRA drafting (4), experience working in the ﬁeld (9), networks with smaller CBOs (3), holding
national level meetings (5) and their own extensive research (4)
– Level of knowledge on FRA provisions and the political climate held by smaller CBOs may be more limited (3)
– The activists have previous experience of working on land rights or social justice issues (4)
Argumentation skills – Gained through experience in inﬂuencing previous or current related policies or involvement in the CSD (16)
Personal motivation – The FRA is part of a wider struggle for land justice (5)
– Connections to the communities (4)
– FRA is a large part of their work so continuation of their organization could be a motivation (7)
External connections – The CSC can draw on many connections at the national and state levels with members sitting on government run expert
committees, or advice organs such as the National Advisory Council under the previous government
Legal legitimacy – All the coalition members interviewed were registered under the Societies Registration Act (1860), giving them legal
legitimacy, though some smaller CBOs in the coalition would not be
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CSC and the anticipated success of certain strategies. Firstly,
their ability to make coalition-level strategy choices is positively
inﬂuenced at both national and state levels by (i) the open list-
serv which enables members to connect, and (ii) the high level
of knowledge of the FRA and on the ground issues which
informs CSC-level discussions. However coordination is nega-
tively inﬂuenced by the heterogeneity of members, diversity of
beliefs on implementation issues, lack of dedicated funding for
collaboration, and varying degrees of legitimacy aﬀorded by
many MoEFC and FD oﬃcials.
Secondly, funding challenges and elements of the wider
institutional setting (a weak MoTA and hostile environment
for civil society) appear to inﬂuence the range of strategy types
and target audiences perceived as available to the CSC. Collab-
orative executive strategies are favored above conﬂictive
strategies. This choice is reinforced by members’ perception
that collaborative strategies can be successful as they open
up channels for conﬂictive strategies. It is also compounded
by the positive experiences of some members who have collab-
orated with oﬃcials in the past (such as in the Joint Commit-
tee). The high level of knowledge and argumentation skills
allows for the CSC to choose cognitive strategies. Strategy
choices and their target audiences are also inﬂuenced by three
factors: (i) the personal motivations of members, (ii) the per-
ceived perceptiveness of politicians and oﬃcials, and (iii) mem-
bers’ perception of their legitimacy in the eyes of diﬀerent state
actors.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
During late policy-making the CSC can be characterized as
a form of non-trivial collective action among a heterogeneous
group of actors sharing the belief that the FRA should be
implemented, but that it is only weakly coordinating its strate-
gies to reach this goal. The CSC therefore conforms with
Sabatier & Weible’s deﬁnition of a coalition, though our
results do add nuance to our understanding of the functional-
ity of coalitions during late policy-making (as will be discussed
below).
The CSC at national and state levels employs both conﬂic-
tive and collaborative executive strategies which are comple-
mented by conﬂictive strategies at member-level. This
supports ﬁndings in literature that CSOs work both within
and outside the state (Hertel, 2015; OHanyan, 2012). Both
cognitive and normative strategies are mostly being performed
at member level rather than CSC level, with media attention
being seen as complementary to other strategies. We observe
some coordination in Odisha of both executive and cognitive
strategies, whereas in AP there appears to be little coordina-
tion of the more geographically dispersed members. This could
potentially be partly due to the diﬀerent historical contexts of
community forestry across the two states, as raised earlier. The
CSC’s attention at both national and state levels is mostly
directed at the executive and bureaucracy, but interestingly,
though the actions of the FD are seen as a major obstacle to
FRA implementation by 20 of the 22 respondents, the coali-
tion does not, or cannot, direct its eﬀorts toward the basic
training of FD oﬃcers.
Our analysis of the resource mix at the disposal of the CSC
and the success they anticipate from employing various strate-
gies, helps to explain why strategies are employed at both the
CSC and member level during policy implementation. Kumar
and Kerr (2012, p.768) found that the success of the CSC in
getting the Act passed was due to ‘‘the open and ﬂexible net-
work structure; the capacity to mobilise masses at the
grassroots; the ability to leverage expertise and research; and
the capability to generate and circulate credible frames of jus-
tice, legitimacy, and rights of the poor”. While the loose
heterogeneous network structure and resources highlighted
by Kumar and Kerr (2012) are also found in the CSC during
policy implementation, we observe that diversity of beliefs on
implementation issues, lack of dedicated funding for collabo-
ration, and varying degrees of legitimacy aﬀorded by many
MoEFC and FD oﬃcials, limits the ability of the CSC to make
coalition-level decisions which individual members are moti-
vated and able to implement. This makes it more likely that
members will make independent decisions as to where they
direct their attention and eﬀorts based on their own resource
mix, organizational approach (collaborative or conﬂictive)
and anticipated success. Our observations conform with
March & Olsen who argue that calculations of appropriate
action appear to be based on ‘‘organisational arrangements
that link roles/identities, accounts of situations, resources,
and prescriptive rules and practices” (March and Olsen,
2006, p. 690). The accessible resource mix and the wider insti-
tutional setting favor collaborative strategies above conﬂictive
strategies at both national and state levels, and enable the CSC
to lean heavily on cognitive strategies.
So what potential eﬀects do these strategy choices have on
FRA implementation? The ACF and network literature would
argue that the limited ability of the CSC to make coalition-
level decisions weakens the strength with which coordinated
strategies can be carried out. This is signiﬁcant for the poten-
tial eﬀect of the CSC on FRA implementation given that the
type of policy implementation issues the CSC itself identiﬁes
(Table 10) encompass cultural changes within large state insti-
tutions, thus appearing to call for CSC-level collective pressure
in national or state arenas. At state level, there is a correlation
between a more connected CSC in Odisha and a higher level of
implementation. In AP CSC members feel this lack of a
strongly connected network reduces the impact they can have
on state-level institutions, with one member stating ‘‘if we are
the only ones writing letters etc. the government thinks this is
just the concern of one NGO”. The causal relations between a
strong CSC network and policy implementation require fur-
ther research if we are to understand the role CSCs can play
in this political context. Our research did reveal other exoge-
nous factors which come into play in AP such as the diverted
political attention due to bifurcation and lack of funding for
CSOs.
Some direct eﬀects can be seen from the collaborative exec-
utive strategies in the form of government circulars issued
after high-level oﬃcials attended CSC-led consultations, or
the contribution of the CSC members in the Joint Committee
to the Amended Rules issued in 2012. Members argued that
conﬂictive strategies such as rallies or open letters, maintain
pressure on oﬃcials and generate wider attention. This was
especially important when the state threatened to dilute the
FRA by reducing the scope of its applicability. The normative
strategies cannot be expected to have much inﬂuence on policy
processes, given the limited number of newspaper articles
including quotations from CSC members. Respondents feel
a compilation of strategies is required as their eﬀects are deter-
mined by other factors such as the timing of their eﬀorts (e.g.,
making use of elections), the opportunities to discuss FRA
issues in multiple forums and the target oﬃcials’ own views
on FRA implementation and division of responsibilities for
policy implementation. Our analysis also reveals the mixed
legitimacy aﬀorded to CSC members by MoEFC/FD oﬃcials
meaning they’re likely to view the CSC’s research through a
perceptual ﬁlter (Sabatier & Weible, 2007) which leads them
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to question its scientiﬁc integrity. This inﬂuences the potential
eﬀects of an organization’s cognitive strategies.
We have shown that political debates and struggles sur-
rounding forest tenure transition policies, such as the FRA,
do not simply end once an Act has been passed and legislation
has been drafted. Late policy-making during policy implemen-
tation (Hill & Hupe, 2002) appears to take on a new form as
decision-making venues disperse and civil society actors
restrategize as to how they can best inﬂuence policy processes
in favor of their own beliefs and interests. Through our case
selection we have seen distinctions between the states, but also
many similarities in the types of resources CSCs can access
and the decisions they make. This leads us to claim that we
can draw insights that have wider applicability to other states
where CSOs are involved in FRA implementation, but also
even more broadly, to situations in which CSCs are attempting
to inﬂuence tenure reform policy implementation. We present
two wider interrelated discussions to stimulate further research
on CSCs involved in policy implementation.
Firstly, our contribution to ACF literature revolves around
our observations of the signiﬁcance of secondary beliefs to the
strength of coalitions during policy implementation. Our
results lead us to argue that shared policy beliefs (here seen
as the belief that the FRA should be implemented) may pro-
vide suﬃcient binding power when there is a clear common
goal and target audience during policy design (or early
policy-making). However, they appear to be insuﬃcient to
unite the CSC in the context of diﬀuse decision-making across
levels during policy implementation (late policy-making). The
diversity in shared beliefs (both why members feel the FRA
should be implemented, and the secondary beliefs of the main
implementation issues) appears to be one reason why strategy
choices are not purely made as a coalition during policy imple-
mentation. Further empirical research is required to under-
stand how ACF assumptions on the binding power of belief
systems apply to late policy-making where decision-making
arenas are more diﬀuse. Drawing on assemblage theory (De
Landa, 2006), which introduces notions of overlapping mem-
bership, linking elements and bridging people between assem-
blages of actors may bring useful insights (see Kumar, 2014).
Our results also hint at relationships between the types of
beliefs i.e., the reasons coalition members fought for the
FRA helped explain the diversity of perceived implementation
issues. This requires further empirical exploration if we are to
better understand the strength of coalitions in inﬂuencing pol-
icy implementation. Do the reasons a coalition member fought
for FRA inﬂuence their perceived implementation issues
which in turn aﬀects their strategy choices? Or alternatively,
do the reasons a coalition member fought for FRA aﬀect their
strategies during implementation, which in turn aﬀects the per-
ceived implementation issues?
Secondly, our analytical framework provides a useful tool
for assessing CSCs’ strategy choices. It can be used ex ante
to help predict their likely impact on policy processes, or
ex post to explain the level and form of impact assigned to
particular strategy choices. We complemented ACF’s focus
on belief systems by drawing on insights from political ecol-
ogy and civil society/social movements to inform our frame-
work. Analytically distinguishing between the resources
coalitions can access and the strategies they employ helped
us draw out the two types of inﬂuence the resource mix
can have on strategy choices. We purposefully did not
attempt to draw out direct causal relationships between par-
ticular resources and strategies employed. This proved useful
given the interplay of factors at both coalition and member
level, which determine strategy choices. We suggest future
research explores nuances in coalition heterogeneity such as
including attention for the history of the emergence of coali-
tions, overlapping memberships, material and expressive
properties of organizations and elements linking members
and coalitions (as also suggested in Kumar, 2014; Matti &
Sandstro¨m, 2011). This would further improve our under-
standing of the complexities of coalition membership in late
policy-making.
Observed diﬃculties in forest policy implementation and
lack of empirical research on the role of CSCs in this political
process triggered this research. So what can we draw from this
paper which could help us to better understand issues in forest
policy implementation? The shortcomings with state-led forest
policy implementation have been widely reported and have
been used to argue for more civil society involvement to
improve implementation processes. Our empirical contribu-
tion to this debate is to argue that CSOs, both as individual
organizations and as part of loose coalitions, are certainly
important actors in this political process, and could potentially
aﬀect the direction of policy implementation. Our analysis
does however show that they certainly cannot be seen as a sil-
ver bullet to solve limitations of state-led policy implementa-
tion, at least not in the constrained political and institutional
context currently found in India. Forest policy implementa-
tion is inherently political and the extent to which CSOs, either
individually or as part of a coalition, are able to inﬂuence pol-
icy implementation for the better is an important question that
still needs to be empirically assessed in diﬀerent contexts and
across diﬀerent scales. Understanding the strategy choices, as
analyzed here, is the ﬁrst step. Analyzing how these strategies
play out in combination, and over lengthy implementation
processes, will be the next step to developing an empirically
rich basis for wider discussions over the current and potential
roles of various state and non-state actors involved in late
policy-making processes in contentious policies of forest gover-
nance.
NOTES
1. The boundaries of what constitutes civil society are not clear
(Edwards, 2009). We distinguish between the following CSOs: NGOs as
professional organisations with a paid staﬀ base; CBOs as voluntary local
organisations working at district level or lower and People’s movements
campaigning at state or national level through their loose network of
activists and CBOs. As we note the over-simplicity of an NGO/ people’s
(or social) movements binary (Batley, 2011; Brown, 2014) we use these
deﬁnitions purely as an identiﬁcation tool and make no assumptions as to
the activities in which they engage.
2. Further details of the results are available upon request
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